Aliakbarzadeh, Kitto, and Bruza (arXiv:1909.13048v1) criticize the Contextuality-by-Default (CbD) theory in three ways: (1) they claim an internal contradiction within the theory, that consists in both denying and accepting the equality of stochastically unrelated random variables; (2) they find CbD deficient because when one confines one's attention to consistently connected systems (those with no disturbance/signaling) one can dispense with the double-indexation of random variables; and (3) they see no relationship between double-indexation and ontic states. This commentary shows that (re 1) the contradiction is inserted in the presentation of CbD by the authors of the paper; (re 2) in the case of consistently connected systems CbD properly specializes to traditional understanding of contextuality; and (re 3) if ontic states are understood as quantum states, they are simply not within the language of CbD, and if they are understood as domain probability spaces for context-sharing random variables, they can be trivially reconstructed.
Aliakbarzadeh, Kitto, and Bruza, in Ref. [1] , henceforth referred to as [AKB], criticize the Contextualityby-Default (CbD) theory [2] [3] [4] using three methods of argumentation, summarized in the three subsequent section titles.
Method 1: Insert a contradiction, then critisize it
The main criticism of CbD in [AKB] is based on the analysis of Ernst Specker's parable of the seer with three magic boxes [5] . Mathematically, it is a special case of a cyclic system of rank 3 [6, 7] : in CbD notation,
where a j i is a dichotomous (say, ±1) random variable measuring property q i in context c j . Specker's special case of this system is a PR box with uniform marginals:
Pr a j i = 1 = 0.5, for all i, j, and
Pr a 1 1 = a 1 2 = Pr a 2 2 = a 2 3 = Pr a 3 1 = −a 3 3 = 1. (2) [AKB] correctly points out that in CbD any two a j i and a j ′ i are stochastically unrelated (do not have a joint distribution) if j = j ′ . It follows that no probability like Pr a j i = a j ′ i is defined for such random variables. This expression is meaningless.
However, when [AKB] provides a definition of consistent connectedness, central for the paper, the authors get more creative. The first part of Definition 2 (p. 3) * E-mail: ehtibar@purdue.edu states that a system is consistently connected if a j i ∼ a j ′ i (i.e., the variables are identically distributed) for any i, j, j ′ for which the random variables exist. This is a correct presentation of the CbD definition: e.g., in (1), a 1 2 ∼ a 2 2 , a 2 3 ∼ a 3 3 , and a 3 1 ∼ a 1 1 (because they are all uniformly distributed). The second part of Definition 2, however, is where the creative insertion occurs:
Alternatively, this relation is denoted
No, the authors of [AKB] should be told, the relation a j i ∼ a j ′ i is not "denoted" so, alternatively or otherwise: Pr a j i = a j ′ i is undefined because a j i and a j ′ i are not jointly distributed. This logical error is inserted immediately after citing a paper by de Barros, Kujala, and Oas [8] , so that a reader not familiar with the issues should think it was taken from there. The correct way system C 3 in (1) in analyzed in CbD is as follows (see, e.g., [6] ). We consider all possible couplings S of C 3 , i.e., all sextuples of jointly distributed random variables
that have the same row-wise distributions as C 3 , and we ask whether this class of couplings contains one which is maximally connected. The latter means that the probability of S j i = S j ′ i is maximal possible for all i, j, j ′ for which the random variables exist. A simple theorem tells us that since S j i ∼ S j ′ i , the maximal possible Pr S j i = S j ′ i is 1. For system C 3 such a coupling does not exist, and this means that C 3 is a contextual system. The non-existence of such a coupling can be established in various ways, e.g., by invoking the general theory of cyclic systems [9, 10] and showing that C 3 violates the corresponding Bell-type inequality, presented below in (6) . In this especially simple case, however, it can also be shown by reductio: if such a coupling exists, then with probability 1 we should have
which is impossible since S 1 1 is not zero. The authors of [AKB] begin their analysis of CbD by providing a version of this reductio reasoning. However, they apply it to system C 3 itself, using a j i 's in place of the jointly distributed S j i 's. They say:
Here, we assume a j i = a j ′ i for j = j ′ for any measurement i in two different contexts j and
At first they do not claim that this assumption is shared by CbD. They even correctly state the opposite:
However, this argument seems not to be matched by the CbD approach since the equality a j i = a j ′ i violates the double indexing assumption (p. 4).
Stated more precisely, a j i = a j ′ i contradicts CbD. However, a few lines later [AKB] makes a bold promise:
We will show that this [CbD] approach [...] also requires the equality a j i = a j ′ i (p. 4).
This sounds ominous for CbD: if it requires something that it deems meaningless, then it is bad indeed. However, the promised demonstration consists in once again loosely replicating the reductio reasoning with a j i 's in place of S j i 's (i.e., with the built-in "assumption" that a j i = a j ′ i ), and then saying This proof considers an equality between two random variables of each connection:
Where, one should ask, is it shown that this equality is required in the CbD analysis? Apparently, "showing" in [AKM] means repeating with no justification something its authors promised to "show." [AKB] presents this second criticism as a consequence of the reasoning just considered, but it deserves to be presented as an argument sui generis:
if we ignore the double indexing scenario, we can [...] convert the CbD notation to the standard representation of Specker scenario. This demonstrates that CbD adds extra complexity to the modelling of scenarios like Specker's, without adding new insights to contextuality (p.4).
The reason this statement deserves to be separated from the preceding it Method 1 "arguments" is that it does make sense. In the case of consistently connected systems one indeed can use the so-called reduced (singleindexed) couplings [11] . In the case of C 3 in (1) it would be a jointly distributed triple (S 1 , S 2 , S 3 ). Moreover, if one is willing to overlook certain logical difficulties [3, 13] , one can use single-indexed notation for the original random variables, conveniently confusing them with their reduced coupling. Indeed, traditional contextuality analysis of C 3 would deal with
instead of (1). The reason why this single-indexed representation is strictly speaking incorrect is that in classical probability theory the existence of any two of the three row-wise joint distributions in (5) implies the existence of a joint distribution of (a 1 , a 2 , a 3 ) [3, 13] . In the case of a contextual system, this creates a true paradox. For instance, if the Bell-type inequality for (5) is violated,
we are facing the unresolvable problem of how it is possible that a 1 a 2 , a 2 a 3 , a 3 a 1 are defined (otherwise the inequality cannot be formulated) whereas a 1 a 2 a 3 is not (otherwise the expression would be ≤ 1). However, the authors who think that the eristic Method 1 constitutes legitimate reasoning are unlikely to be bothered by such logical problems. Moreover, singleindexation of consistently connected systems is a common and convenient practice, even if logically dubious. Why, however, this is presented as a deficiency of CbD? Historically, CbD was proposed as an attempt to understand contextuality in rigorous probabilisitic terms [14] . The fact that it has rapidly developed into a generalization of the traditional notion of contextuality to arbitrary, inconsistently connected systems can be viewed as clear evidence that it does provide the "new insights" that [AKB] does not see in it. Inconsistently connected systems are those in which the distributions of a j i and a j ′ i for measurements of the same property in two different contexts may be different. This situation (also designated as "disturbance" or "signaling") sometimes occurs in quantum physics, and then CbD is a useful way of dealing with it (see, e.g., [7] ). This situation is virtually universal in behavioral applications, and here CbD serves to correct the researchers who have mistakenly used the criteria developed in physics for consistently connected systems [15, 16] . Some of the authors of [AKB] were making this same mistake [17, 18] until they learned of CbD and began using it to analyze their experiments [19] . As a generalization of the traditional understanding of contextuality rather than an entirely different notion called by the same name, CbD must specialize to it (more precisely, to a rigorous version thereof) for systems that are consistently connected. To criticize CbD for this is akin to criticizing Lebesgue integration for being unnecessary when one confines one's attention to Riemann-integrable functions.
Method 3: Critisize a theory for not addressing issues that are not in its language
Another angle of criticism is formulated in the statement that [AKB] has demonstrated that there is no clear relation between the double indexing notation and ontic states (p. 5).
"Demonstrating" and "showing" for the authors of [AKB] seems to mean the same as "stating." It is difficult to find a line of reasoning leading them to their conclusion. Nor is it clear what they mean by the ontic states. In another place [AKB] says that CbD fails to provide a more specific definition of precisely how the contexts of the double indexed random variables relate to λ (p. 3).
The symbol λ in the statement denotes a "hidden variable," which suggests that this notion possibly relates to that of ontic state. A hidden variable means a random variable of which all random variables within a given context are functions. That such a variable exists is an incontrovertible mathematical fact in classical probability theory, proved as a theorem immediately following from the definition of a joint distribution [11, 12] . For instance, since a 1 1 and a 1 2 in (1) are jointly distributed, there is a random variable λ and two measurable functions such that a 1 1 = f (λ) and a 1 2 = g (λ). Obviously, λ is not definable uniquely, but one can always define λ in the most economic way, so that if a 1 1 and a 1 2 are also functions of some random variable κ, then λ = h (κ) for some function h [3, 13] . So the relationship between the observed and hidden variables is far from being unclear, it is rather straightforward.
It is possible, however, that the authors of [AKB] understand ontic states as quantum states. This interpretation is supported by the various allusions in [AKB] to how CbD does not address certain quantum-mechanical notions, such as CbD notation does not discuss scenarios where measurements are non-orthogonal (p. 4).
One may let it pass that notations rarely "discuss" anything. But one should not let pass that [AKB] here confuses different languages and levels of analyzing contextuality. CbD is a theory of systems of random variables, and as such it does not use the language of quantum observables and quantum states. But the responses generated by states and observables are random variables, and at this level CbD applies to them. CbD does not address quantum-mechanical terms in the same way it does not address states of mind or computer databases (but may apply to them if the recorded outcomes are presented as systems of random variables).
Conclusion
Unfortunately, not all readers who may be curious to look into [AKB] should have sufficient involvement in the area of contextuality to see all the misrepresentations and glitches in logic this paper contains. This justifies the need for the present clarifications. I only responded to the three main lines of criticism found in [AKB], represented by the three eristic methods its authors employ. However, [AKB] contains many other, less prominent but no less unfortunate imprecisions in language and logic. For instance, the authors cite a CbD work as stating that couplings, like (3) with respect to (1) , have no empirical meaning, and present this fact as an obvious deficiency of CbD. Apparently they do not distinguish lack of empirical meaning (indicating that a notion is a mathematical abstraction with no empirical referent) from being meaningless (indicating that a notion is to be discarded). It would take another page or two to enumerate all such "pricks and bites" in [AKB]. Hopefully this is not necessary.
